Truce in Tatters: Donbass is Gearing Up For War, This Despite Chief Monitor of OSCE’s Best Efforts
Opinion with Evelina Zakamskaya
— Mr. Hug, thank you for finding the time for us.
— Thank you for having me.
— The situation in Donbass is deteriorating, leaving 107 people dead since the beginning of the year. The truce has been violated more than 100,000 times. You spend quite a lot time in Donbass. What do you think are the reasons for the escalation?
Alexander Hug, the Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine:
— Obviously, both sides violate the Minsk Agreements, of which there are 7. There are two or three main reasons for all the civilian casualties. Firstly, military equipment isn't being withdrawn from both sides of the contact line, including multiple rocket launcher systems, artillery, and tanks. Secondly, it's the proximity of the troops and armed groups. Sometimes, they're located on the opposite sides of the street at a stone's throw from each other, which often results in hostilities. It is also the reason for such a high number of casualties. Another reason is the use of mines. I remind you that in 2014 it was agreed not to place new minefields and dismantle the existing ones on both sides of the contact line. But the mines are still there.
— The contact lines have moved closer together, as have both parties to the conflict. It's well-known that the reason for it is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces captured so-called "Grey zones" — several villages within the contact area. What's the reaction of the OSCE and what's your view of it?
— The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine is to monitor the situation and report on the actions of the parties on both sides of the contact line, which is reflected in our daily reports that are available on the official website in English, Russian, and Ukrainian. It's important to note that the "Grey zones" aren't defined by the Minsk Agreements. The only zone that has been defined is the security zone, which is 15 km on both sides of the contact line. That is, it makes a 40-km security zone. It must be secure. But, paradoxically, the area along the 500-km contact line is the least secure zone, though it must be secure by default.
— The OSCE special monitoring mission is actually the only entity that can convey objective information to the "Normandy Four" and the whole world. Do you enjoy enough power and possibilities to cope with this task?
— This is correct. According to the mandate approved by 57 member states, including Ukraine and Russian Federation, we are tasked with monitoring and reporting the situation in Ukraine as well as in Dobass and Ukraine' eastern regions. Moreover, it's vital for the OSCE to enjoy the freedom of movement to fulfill its task. But the both parties keep restricting the freedom of movement of the mission. First, they neither remove restrictions on the ground nor stop hostilities. But sometimes they threaten our observers even with a gun or the use of force. The same case with our drones while they're in the air. Firstly, to ensure a more efficient work of the OSCE mission, the parties must respect the agreements, the clauses ensuring our security so that we could work efficiently. It has already been agreed. Secondly, the only reason for the restriction of our freedom of movement is the parties' reluctance to show us the actual situation on the ground as they know that we'll cover it in our public reports. Of course, the parties aren't comfortable reading our reports. It's the list of their violations. So, they often hamper our work for this reason. But we must report the situation on the ground.
— What is the proportion of violations and restrictions by the sides? Is it 50-50? Or one side is more active than the other at creating obstacles for the mission?
— The restrictions are different. There are passive restrictions of our freedom of movement. Of course, we can say it is 50-50. But speaking about restrictions related to the threats to our observers, there are more of them in the regions beyond the government's control.
— What do you think is the role of political will in the settlement of the conflict and in exercising influence on the sides?
— The OSCE special monitoring mission has established the fact that the sides are in full control of hostilities. We have no doubts about it. The sides express their commitment to the ceasefire during Christmas, harvesting, Easter holidays. Then, we see that the number of violations along the contact line tends to decrease from thousands to hundreds and tens. It signals that when the parties want to stop it, they can do it. The problem is not with orders or command. Well, there's a slight problem with bringing orders to the ground, but you're right to say that it all depends on the political will. Without the political will and necessary discipline to fulfill orders and agreements we'll see more people dead and wounded.
— Do you mean that the escalation we've witnessed in the past months, and especially in the past weeks, isn't due to a spontaneous impulse of the sides, but to a political plan?
— Artillery, Kalashnikovs, tanks, mortars don't fire on their own. There needs to be an order or someone just willing to shoot. It's their deliberate decision to make use of arms on both sides of the contact line. We've been observing this cycle of violence for the past four years. What has happened recently is not new. Once again, unless the very basic fundamental military-technical measures are implemented, such as military disengagement, and demining; the situation won't improve. But we'll continue to document the situation at all levels. Unless the parties fully implement the agreements reached in 2015 and later, the situation won't change.
— What's the impact of the reintegration law adopted in Kiev on the implementation of the agreements and the military situation in Donbass as a whole?
— I think it's too early to estimate the implications of this law. We are aware of the law. Our mission carefully observes the implications of the law on the ground. All the results will be reflected in our public reports, which are published six days a week. But to answer your question, I reiterate that it isn't a problem for the Minsk process; it is not dead. The thing is that the parties failed to fully fulfill the agreements. We also forget that too many people outside the Minsk process are complaining about the process. More people should be involved in it so that more people resolutely fulfill the Minsk Agreements. It's crucial.
— We'll move back to your question and your words. But first, let me clarify something. Do you think that the law on Donbass reintegration doesn't contradict Steinmeier's plan and the previous agreements concluded in Minsk which provide for the autonomy of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and special elections?
— I'm not in the position to make judgments, as I've already mentioned. According to our tasks, we must document the implications of the law on the ground. So far, they aren't clear enough for us to shed some light on in our reports. As soon as our observers see the implications, we'll reveal them. These objective facts enable decision-making within the "Normandy Four." The media and the community also benefit from it because this information is fundamental for decision-making, as in such a case, there's no need to dispute the facts; the objective data will be there, you will only have to make a well-informed decision based on objective facts.
— Let's go back to what you said earlier. You've said that the Minsk Agreements aren't bad per se, the thing is that people failed to fulfill their promises and obligations. Does it mean that the negotiators should be changed to ensure the implementation of the agreements?
— Again, when we've been discussing it, I've said that what is needed is the will. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. Making this depending on personalities of all the sides committed to the fulfillment of the agreements, is, of course, an important and complex decision. But if the will is not there to make this decision, the conflict is likely to continue.
— You may answer my next question to the extent you're authorized to. What kind of political will do you think is able to make the parties, Kiev, in particular, fulfill the Minsk Agreements?
— As I've mentioned before, speaking about military-technical issues, there are several measures to be taken, for instance, military disengagement, withdrawing equipment, and demining. These are three basic measures that are effective in stabilizing the situation on the ground. As soon as these measures are taken, the ceasefire will be irrevocable. But we haven't seen it so far, so the situation still remains unpredictable. Over the past 3.5 weeks, we've witnessed civilian casualties on both sides of the contact line.
— In your opinion, one thing that could encourage civilians is the opening of new checkpoints at the contact line. How feasible is that?
— Once again, I'm not trying to evade the question, but again, it depends on the will. You know that the checkpoints — there are only five of them — aren't subject to the Minsk Agreements. That is, the parties can easily open more checkpoints. I'd like to stress another important point. If the parties heed the fears, concerns, and problems of the people they claim to be protecting, it will be easier for the parties to make decisions. This is a humanitarian issue since the parties claim to be protecting civilians. Thus, political decisions must be made on both sides of the contact line. If the needs of these people are ignored, we'll face a stalemate. Indeed, more checkpoints should be opened, and they must work around the clock. Of course, we understand the importance of border crossing procedures, but these procedures shouldn't contradict the interests of the civilians. Around 40,000 civilians cross the contact line every day. That's an optimistic development of the situation. We will continue to monitor whether both sides are taking action to protect people in order to ensure that people have freedom of movement because these people are real residents that live in real homes. Their interests are to be respected. If a premium is put on their interests, I'm convinced that a solution will be found.
— What do you think about a broader political dialogue, in particular, the expansion of the "Normandy Four" and the invitation of a UN mission to Donbass?
— First of all, I think any dialogue seeking a solution to the conflict should be encouraged. In the end, the conflict can only be solved by a dialogue. Any additional opportunities for a scrupulous discussion should be welcomed. The same applies for any additional measures that can contribute to resolving the conflict, be it a UN operation or any other operation that will help stabilize the conflict in Ukraine. Indeed, it would be helpful.
— So, my last question. You came to Moscow with what goals in mind? What are the results of your meetings? Like any other person, you have your own plans, your own vision and goals. In your opinion, how long will the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine operate?
— Well, I'm in the Russian capital here at the invitation of the Primakov Institute. It's a perfect opportunity to talk and deliberate. As concerns the OSCE special monitoring mission to Ukraine and mandate, it depends on the decision of the Permanent Council in Vienna. 57 OSCE member states make the decision to extend the mandate annually. Of course, it's not up to my colleagues or me. It's the Permanent Council that makes such decisions. First of all, discussions about the Ukrainian conflict should be held. Then, our mandate will be discussed, which currently terminates in March 2019.
— I just wanted to ask when peace will finally come to Donbass.
— Here, I can give you my personal opinion. More than four years is too long a period. I've already said that the conflict can be stopped even today. There's no underlying group that would hamper an immediate cessation of what's going on. Peace can be brought to Donbass today.
— Thank you for your perspective.
Opinion with Evelina Zakamskaya